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ABSTRACT 
 
Financial markets and financial intermediation are 
essential to well-functioning economy. They perform the 
role of channeling funds to parties that have value creating 
investment opportunities. However, asymmetric 
information can seriously impair the process when parties 
to the financial contract are not fully aware of the risks 
involved and, as a result, can limit their exposure to 
financial agreements to prevent themselves from possible 
losses. Increasing asymmetric information as we explain in 
the article has a tendency to bring a ripple effect in the 
financial system. This negative money multiplier then sets 
the stage until it severely hampers money supply, 
productive investment opportunities and finally aggregate 
economic activity. The article introduces the reader with 
the framework of asymmetric information developed by 
several authors in the last few decades and builds on the 
recent financial developments that pose new challenges.  
 
The theory of asymmetric information is one of the most powerful framework theories that can explain 
data patterns in the different factors during the periods of economic crises.  
The academics have analyzed the asymmetric information and its consequences that arise due to 
dissimilarities of information that is available to parties that enter financial agreements. Often the main 
problem is that borrowers are more alert of pitfalls of financial contract since they are better aware of 
the risks involved in a project for which financing is requested. These informational differences are the 
very underlying cause of adverse selection or what is already known as the lemons problem which was 
introduced by Akerlof in 1970. A lemons problem occurs in debt markets because lenders have trouble 
determining whether borrower’s investment opportunities are attractive enough compared to the level 
of risk involved (i.e. he is a “good risk” or “bad risk”). When that happens, lenders provide loans at an 
average interest rate that balances off expected return for a loan portfolio that constitutes both high 
quality and low quality credits. Presumably, one can see this as a fact that risks and the associated 
required return for high quality borrowers is overstated, whereas that of low quality borrowers is 
understated. Lenders tend to average out these differences; as a result, high quality borrowers end up 
paying more, whereas low quality borrowers less than they should. If that happens, high quality 
borrowers will not seek financing and forego profitable investment opportunities. 
Furthermore, as demonstrated by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), borrowers with the riskiest investment 
projects will now be the ones most likely to take out the loans at high interest rates, since they will reap 
the benefits and leave the loses for lenders should they occur. These risky undertakings on behalf of 
borrowers will result in lenders cutting down on the number of loans that they make, this way causing 
the supply of loans decrease with higher interest rates more than it would at equilibrium. Mankiw 
(1986) has shown that a marginal increase in the risk-free rate can significantly decrease or even cause a 
collapse in lending through the ripple effect described above. 
  
The mechanism suggests that a major sign of financial crisis would be a significant increase in interest 
rate of loans available for those borrowers whose risk characteristics are hard to identify. Higher and 
lower grade bond yields essentially reflect the perception about the risk related to the undertakings of 
higher and lower quality borrowers. This perception might arise either because the lenders are well 
aware of the risks related to both high and low quality borrowers, or more likely, because information 
about the low quality borrowers is not available. As a result, the large spread between high and low 
grade bonds should signal when the adverse selection problem in the debt markets is far stretching. 
 
To reduce the adverse selection problem in debt markets lenders secure their loans with collaterals or 
with the borrowers’ net worth. However, value of collateral or net worth can decrease because of lower 
future income streams (ex. market crash, see Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1988, Bernanke and Gertler, 1989) 
or increased interest rates at which one discounts these income streams. As a result, should a borrower 
default in any of these cases, the lender will bear higher losses not covered by the value of collateral. 
Just as before, we expect that the adverse selection problem stemming from the situation will again 
widen the spread of interest rates on loans between low-quality and high-quality borrowers due to 
differences in information available on the two groups of borrowers.  
Asymmetric information also leads to moral hazard problem between the parties to the contract that 
again impairs financial efficiency. Moral hazard refers to borrower’s behavior that occurs after the 
financing has been obtained. Because lenders are not fully able to ascertain the quality of investment or 
monitor the use of the funds, the borrower has incentive to engage in personally beneficial activities (ex. 
excessive risk taking, misallocation of funds) that increases the probability of default and deteriorates 
the quality of loan. The borrower will reap the benefits should it turn for the best, while lender will bear 
the losses if borrower defaults.  
This agency problem between the contract 
parties will result in suboptimal levels of 
financing as lenders cut down on number of 
loans trying to limit themselves from the 
losses.  
The agency problem will further amplify the 
ripple effect on the aggregate economy 
should there occur an unanticipated 
deflation. Under deflation, real value of 
debt grows while the real value of assets 
does not and wealth is redistributed to 
lenders at the expense of borrowers. 
Shrinking net worth of borrowers would 
prevent them from new undertakings which 
would eventually lead to decline in 
investment and economic activity. 
 
The presence of information asymmetries 
in debt markets explains the vital role that 
banks play in reducing adverse selection and moral hazard in credit markets through financial 
intermediation.  
The expertise that they have in screening and distinguishing bad borrowers from good ones allows them 
to reduce information asymmetries at low cost (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1983). 
1.1   2008 Financial Turmoil and the “Lemon Brothers” 
The failure of financial intermediation and the resulting 
increase in asymmetric information is a probably the simplest 
best way to explain the recent financial turmoil that has led to 
global downturn. 
Slowing economy coupled with insolvency of mortgage 
borrowers and the housing market crash caused the value of 
collaterals to drop sharply. Huge losses related to mortgage 
related debt instruments pushed a major financial institution – 
Lehman Brothers - into bankruptcy and caused increased risk-
aversion in the markets. Because many financial and non-
financial institutions had exposure to these collateralized debt 
obligations, banks stopped the lending since they could not 
distinguish between those who had loss bearing positions in 
CDOs and could default and those who were not. This has lead 
to an immediate spike in interest rates and dry-up of liquidity 
in debt markets. As a result, even largest and most prominent 
US bluechips could not access debt markets to fund their 
operations and investment activities. This caused a severe 
drop in production output and a contraction in aggregate 
economic activity. 
 
They are more efficient than individuals in monitoring the contracts and enforcing restrictive covenants 
that reduce moral hazard problem that is likely to arise (Diamond, 1984). 
The existence of asymmetric information in debt markets gives us an important underlying rationale 
about the significance of banks in channeling funds from savers to borrowers who have the most 
attractive investment opportunities. Bernanke (1983) also argued that turmoil in financial markets often 
harms intermediation performed by banks and brings down financing of valuable investment 
opportunities which in the end leads to economic downturn. 
 Bank panics are one major example of the failure of banks to fully perform their intermediation role. In 
a panic, depositors, fearing the safety of their deposits, withdraw them from the banking system and 
cause a major wipe out of funds and significant reduction in lending activities of banks. Undoubtedly the 
asymmetric information is one of the main ingredients of financial panic. As depositors are not able to 
distinguish between solvent and insolvent banks they rush to withdraw funds from all of the banks that 
could possibly fail to meet their obligations or return the deposits in time. The resulting capital deposit 
outflow bank capital to level where they either cannot meet their obligations, provide new loans or 
both. Cost of financial intermediation rises, new profitable investment opportunities are not financed 
and as there is no value created in the economy, it slips into recession.  
Given the absence of intervention of policy makers, bank panic decreases liquidity which leads to higher 
interest rates. The ripple effect continues since higher interest rates as mentioned previously (adverse 
selection) decreases firm value. Therefore, bank run is another channel through which asymmetric 
information both enters the financial markets as well as is further reinforced. Again, as a result, there 
should be a pattern of widening spreads between lower and higher grade investments in the dawn of 
bank panics.  
 
All in all, asymmetric information is a very powerful framework that presents the dynamics and resulting 
downturn that happen once there is a decrease in money supply. However, decline in money supply is 
not the only area of financial discrepancies that asymmetric information can explain. Instead, one 
should take a much broader picture to see informational asymmetries that exist in financial markets (see 
box 1.2) that can induce a financial meltdown. 
1.2 Asymmetric Information and Financial Derivatives 
It appears that with the evolution of financial system and financial products, there not only has been a significant improvement in the 
reduction of information asymmetries in the financial markets through major advances in technology and regulation, but also hand in 
hand increase in information asymmetries through off-balance sheet trading activities in highly complex structured derivative 
products and OTC (over-the-counter) market development. Not to mention that, even simple derivative products such as forwards 
that exhibit steeper pay-off schemes than that of the underlying asset already amplify the consequences of asymmetric information 
through implicit leverage if a party to the contract fails to follow agreement. This can make even simple and sound linear derivative 
contracts very risky. Meanwhile, OTC markets allow for less transparency on such agreements. To continue with the example, OTC 
forward agreements unlike their peer contracts traded on an exchange, i.e. futures, allow parties to engage into contract and settle it 
only on the maturity; this way party losing money in the contract avoids daily margin calls to cover marginal losses should the market 
turn out unfavorable. Again asymmetric information and specifically moral hazard is at its height since party to the contract is not 
aware if the counterparty will be able to meet the obligations on maturity. The loses by the end of the contract might be so huge that 
the party losing money might not be able to follow the agreement. Finally, even more complex derivative contracts such as CDOs 
enable debt to be repackaged and resold to multiple buyers while staying off the bank’s balance sheets; the debt loses its origins – 
risk characteristics are modified and information related to the original debtor is lost. Instead, risk characteristics are assigned by 
parties that are intermediating the contract (i.e. investment banks) as well as those that are trusted to monitor them (i.e. rating 
agencies). Such structure of funneling funds through essentially multiple stages increases significantly asymmetric information 
between the initial borrower and the final lender, whereas the responsibility of reducing these asymmetries is then concentrated in 
the hands of several institutions which - as recent events show – happen to fail in their roles.  
Having said that, it seems that with the development of financial world, asymmetric information, at least in certain markets, has been 
only increasing. No wonder that one of the world’s most renowned investors Warren Buffett has called derivatives the financial 
weapons of mass destruction. 
 
Historically, financial crises have begun with stock market crash, rise in interest rates and resulting credit 
spread rather than with a failure of a financial institution, with the latter more likely being a 
consequence than a cause. The failure of a major financial intermediary however significantly increases 
the uncertainty in the market (see the box 1.1). Ceteris paribus, asymmetric information introduces a 
multiplier effect through which rise in interest rates raises lemons problem in the credit markets, agency 
problem and value destruction in stock markets. Failing banking institutions make the interest rates 
rocket, cause the final stock market crash both of which are reflected in the widening credit spreads 
between high grade and lower grade bonds. The events amplify asymmetric information to the degree 
where economic growth is halted.  
There would be sorting of solvent from insolvent banks through public authorities and clearing-house 
associations (Mishkin, 1990). Furthermore, government as we have seen recently might induce money 
supply by providing liquidity. Uncertainty would slowly fade out, markets might recover, interest rates 
fall back and if deflationary processes would not pertain, one might see credit spreads shrinking and 
economy recovering as seen through 2009. 
This course of events might be hampered if a substantial deflation sets in, leading to a debt-deflation 
process that transfers wealth from debtors to creditors as described by Fisher Irving (1933) and 
deteriorates the value of the companies. Should that happen, given already lower demand for products 
balance sheets of companies would worsen leaving them with excessive liabilities, liquidity problems 
and potential bankruptcy as seen in major corporations in Japan in 1990’s. Investment spending and 
aggregate economy would then remain depressed for a longer period of time. 
 
Figure 1.1 
 
 
As you can see from the figure 1.1, theory is rather consistent with the empirical data. Credit spreads 
seem to balloon in the dawn of a crisis and during recessions. In addition, an interesting finding is that of 
the recent crisis. Apparently seeing signs of slowing economy on August 2007 Federal Reserve of the 
United States cut interest rates to induce monetary supply. Despite that, later next month the yield 
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spread between Baa graded bonds and 10-Year treasuries had already been at 20 year historical heights 
well above 2 percentage points. FED continued cutting interest rates in the following months, however, 
that did not stimulate economy sufficiently and on December 2007 the United States had slipped into 
recession which turned out to be comparable in scale to the Great Depression. 
More than that, it is surprising to see how Mishkin (2000) has presented the vicious cycle to the Central 
Bank of Iceland in his later work just to see the meltdown of the county’s financial system ten years 
after. 
To test the predictive power of credit spreads and stock market we ran multiple least squares 
regressions between credits spreads, stock market and US industrial output using different time lags. 
Sample period dating back to 1920’s has been used. We have found that over the period from 1920’s 
until 2010 stock market has had the most explanatory power in predicting negative industrial output 4 
months before it has occurred, whereas wide credit spreads 1 month before the crisis. A sample 
regression in figure 1.2 below shows that despite the fact that the credit spreads between high and low 
quality borrowers have marginal explanatory power for fully predicting economic activity, i.e. low R^2, it 
shows that it is significant to the variation of US industrial output, i.e. high t-value. This is however 
consistent with the fact that timely and well measured monetary easing and liquidity injections from 
central bank not accounted for in the regression often induce lending activities by banks, reduce high 
risk-aversion and information asymmetries in the market that are then reflected in the back drop of 
credit spreads, the result of all which is a prevention financial and economic paralysis. 
All in all, although there has been empirical evidence that the degree of asymmetric information has 
diminished over the course of financial development1, new century and financial derivates for which 
asymmetric information seems to be second nature pose new challenges that we should take very 
seriously.  
 
Figure 1.2 
Dependent Variable: IND (US Industrial output)   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 2 637   
Included observations: 636 after adjustments  
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=6) 
IND=C(1)+C(2)*SPREAD(-1)   
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C(1) 0.236733 0.050135 4.721907 0.0000 
C(2) -1.708171 0.418094 -4.085619 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.046140     Mean dependent var 0.224848 
Adjusted R-squared 0.044636     S.D. dependent var 0.874328 
S.E. of regression 0.854592     Akaike info criterion 2.526754 
Sum squared resid 463.0272     Schwarz criterion 2.540764 
Log likelihood -801.5076     Durbin-Watson stat 1.304958 
     
     
                                                             
1 See Antzoulatos, Tsoumas, Kyriazis (2008), Financial Development and Asymmetric Information  
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